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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-3935 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
  
BARBARA STANLEY, 
   Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2:13-cr-00556-001)  
District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on November 7, 2016 
 
Before:   McKEE, RESTREPO, Circuit Judges, and HORNAK, District Judge 
 
(Opinion Filed:  January 17, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
MCKEE, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
 
 
 Hon. Mark R. Hornak, District Judge for the United States Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Barbara Stanley appeals the District Court’s sentence of 36 months’ incarceration 
imposed for her conviction on several counts of fraud, conversion, and making false 
statements.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the sentence.1  
I. 
Stanley asserts both procedural and substantive challenges to the District Court’s 
sentence, arguing that the District Court (1) failed to address all of her properly presented 
sentencing arguments and (2) imposed a substantively unreasonable above-Guidelines 
sentence without providing adequate explanation to justify the upward variance.  Each 
challenge is governed by a different standard of review, which we address in turn. 
II. 
“[I]n a criminal prosecution, unless a relevant objection has been made earlier, a 
party must object to a procedural error after the sentence is pronounced in order to 
preserve the error and avoid plain error review.”2  Here, Stanley did not object to claim 
any procedural error after the District Court pronounced its sentence, and we will 
therefore review only for plain error.  “An error is plain if it is ‘clear’ or ‘obvious,’ 
‘affects substantial rights,’ and ‘affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.’”3 
                                              
 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
2 U.S. v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 258 (3d Cir. 2014). 
3 Id. at 259 (quoting U.S. v. Dragon, 471 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
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Stanley argues that the District Court failed to respond to the properly presented 
sentencing arguments she included in her sentencing memorandum, as required by United 
States v. Ausburn,4 and that this procedural error requires remand.  Her argument is 
contradicted by the record.   
Though the District Court did not explicitly recite each point defense counsel 
included in her sentencing memorandum, the record shows that the District Court 
considered Stanley’s arguments in deciding her sentence.5  During the sentencing 
hearing, defense counsel chose to adopt the arguments made in her written memorandum, 
rather than repeat them during her oral presentation.  In response, the District Court asked 
defense counsel a question about a particular argument and cited the page number of 
counsel’s sentencing memorandum the court was referring to.6  Accordingly, the record 
shows that the Court had carefully reviewed defense counsel’s sentencing memorandum.  
Indeed, after a brief discussion, the District Court clarified that “[t]hat was the only 
question I had.  I read everything else you submitted.”7  Additionally, before pronouncing 
its sentence, the District Court reiterated that it had “considered everything in [defense 
                                              
 
 
4 502 F.3d 313 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that “the court must acknowledge and respond to 
any properly presented sentencing argument which has colorable legal merit and a factual 
basis”).   
5 U.S. v. Quiles, 618 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A sentencing court need not analyze 
explicitly every argument that a defendant puts forward.”). 
6 “You say, I think you say it a couple of times, but you say it on page 19.  The guideline 
does not take into consideration that the total amount of loss was incurred over at least 
five years, nor does it take into consideration that her offense was not motivated by 
greed.  How do you define greed?”  Sentencing Transcript, App. at 70. 
7 Id. at 70. 
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counsel’s] brief,” and then broadly summarized the arguments in Stanley’s sentencing 
memorandum (i.e. “brief”), without objection or correction by defense counsel.8  It is 
therefore clear that the District Court did not commit any procedural error here, let alone 
any plain error. 
III. 
Stanley also argues that the District Court imposed a substantively unreasonable 
above-Guidelines sentence without providing an adequate explanation.  We review that 
claim for an abuse of discretion.  A court abuses its discretion when its actions are 
unreasonable or violate the law.  “The touchstone of reasonableness is whether the record 
as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).”9  This inquiry is “highly deferential,”10 and we will affirm a district 
court’s procedurally sound sentence “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have 
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court 
provided.”11 
Stanley claims that the District Court failed to differentiate her circumstances from 
other defendants and that the record, taken as a whole, shows that the District Court was 
predisposed against her and did not rationally and meaningfully consider all of the 
statutory sentencing factors when calculating her sentence.   
                                              
 
 
8 Id. at 85–86. 
9 U.S. v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting U.S. v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 
571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc)). 
10 U.S. v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 2007). 
11 U.S. v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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This argument is also contradicted by the record. The Court’s careful 
consideration of the sentencing factors spans over five pages of the hearing transcript.  
Moreover, the District Court explained the factors that led to its determination that an 
upward deviation was appropriate in this case.  These included: the nature of Stanley’s 
multi-year scheme in which she continually lied to government officials and her own 
doctor, Stanley’s lack of remorse, and the need to deter others and protect a government 
program that relies largely on trust.  Though the District Court considered each of the 
relevant § 3553(a) factors, it made clear that these three findings were the driving force 
behind its sentence.  On this record, there is no way that we can now conclude that “no 
reasonable sentencing court” would have imposed this sentence.  Rather, it is clear that 
the sentence was substantively reasonable.  
IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s sentence. 
